Research paperOther ComputationalAdversarial-Resilient RF Fingerprinting: A CNN-GAN Framework for Rogue Transmitter DetectionRaju Dhakal, Prashant Shekhar, Laxima Niure KandelarXiv·2025·10.1109/icmla66185.2025.00192·arXiv:2510.09663AbstractRadio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has evolved as an effective solution for authenticating devices by leveraging the unique imperfections in hardware components involved in the signal generation process. In this work, we propose a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based framework for detecting rogue devices and identifying genuine ones using softmax probability thresholding. We emulate an attack scenario in which adversaries attempt to mimic the RF characteristics of genuine devices by training a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) using in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) samples from genuine devices. The proposed approach is verified using I/Q samples collected from ten different ADALM-PLUTO Software Defined Radios (SDRs), with seven devices considered genuine, two as rogue, and one used for validation to determine the threshold. The GAN’s ability to generate realistic synthetic samples is validated by plotting the I/Q constellations of both real and synthetic signals.Read more
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 1, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 2, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 3, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 4, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 5, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 6, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 7, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 8, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 9, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 10, used as a validation-only device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.3 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
Research paperOther ComputationalAdversarial-Resilient RF Fingerprinting: A CNN-GAN Framework for Rogue Transmitter DetectionRaju Dhakal, Prashant Shekhar, Laxima Niure KandelarXiv·2025·10.1109/icmla66185.2025.00192·arXiv:2510.09663AbstractRadio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has evolved as an effective solution for authenticating devices by leveraging the unique imperfections in hardware components involved in the signal generation process. In this work, we propose a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based framework for detecting rogue devices and identifying genuine ones using softmax probability thresholding. We emulate an attack scenario in which adversaries attempt to mimic the RF characteristics of genuine devices by training a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) using in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) samples from genuine devices. The proposed approach is verified using I/Q samples collected from ten different ADALM-PLUTO Software Defined Radios (SDRs), with seven devices considered genuine, two as rogue, and one used for validation to determine the threshold. The GAN’s ability to generate realistic synthetic samples is validated by plotting the I/Q constellations of both real and synthetic signals.Read more
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 1, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 2, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 3, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 4, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 5, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 6, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 7, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 8, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 9, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 10, used as a validation-only device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.3 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
Research paperOther ComputationalAdversarial-Resilient RF Fingerprinting: A CNN-GAN Framework for Rogue Transmitter DetectionRaju Dhakal, Prashant Shekhar, Laxima Niure KandelarXiv·2025·10.1109/icmla66185.2025.00192·arXiv:2510.09663AbstractRadio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has evolved as an effective solution for authenticating devices by leveraging the unique imperfections in hardware components involved in the signal generation process. In this work, we propose a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based framework for detecting rogue devices and identifying genuine ones using softmax probability thresholding. We emulate an attack scenario in which adversaries attempt to mimic the RF characteristics of genuine devices by training a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) using in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) samples from genuine devices. The proposed approach is verified using I/Q samples collected from ten different ADALM-PLUTO Software Defined Radios (SDRs), with seven devices considered genuine, two as rogue, and one used for validation to determine the threshold. The GAN’s ability to generate realistic synthetic samples is validated by plotting the I/Q constellations of both real and synthetic signals.Read more
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 1, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 2, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 3, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 4, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 5, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 6, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 7, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 8, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 9, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 10, used as a validation-only device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.3 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
Research paperOther ComputationalAdversarial-Resilient RF Fingerprinting: A CNN-GAN Framework for Rogue Transmitter DetectionRaju Dhakal, Prashant Shekhar, Laxima Niure KandelarXiv·2025·10.1109/icmla66185.2025.00192·arXiv:2510.09663AbstractRadio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF) has evolved as an effective solution for authenticating devices by leveraging the unique imperfections in hardware components involved in the signal generation process. In this work, we propose a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)-based framework for detecting rogue devices and identifying genuine ones using softmax probability thresholding. We emulate an attack scenario in which adversaries attempt to mimic the RF characteristics of genuine devices by training a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) using in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) samples from genuine devices. The proposed approach is verified using I/Q samples collected from ten different ADALM-PLUTO Software Defined Radios (SDRs), with seven devices considered genuine, two as rogue, and one used for validation to determine the threshold. The GAN’s ability to generate realistic synthetic samples is validated by plotting the I/Q constellations of both real and synthetic signals.Read more
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 1, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 2, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 3, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 4, used as a rogue transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.5 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 5, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 6, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 7, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 8, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 9, used as a genuine transmitter/source device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.6 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand
ADALM-PLUTO SDR device 10, used as a validation-only device in the RF fingerprinting dataset.3 propertiesExperimentalADALM-PLUTO SDRStudied MaterialExpand